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ABSTRACT 
This paper offers a socio-historical study of the Prud’homie de pêche (the “Prud’homie”), a 
common-pool institution (“CPI”) that has managed the fishery commons at Marseille since the 
Middle Ages. The evidence presented here sheds light on specific challenges faced by the 
Prud’homie during the early stages of globalisation: one challenge is the import of a new 
fishing technique (the madrague) in the early 17th century, and another challenge is the arrival 
of migrant fishermen from Catalonia throughout the 18th century. On this basis, this paper 
explores the ways in which globalisation has impacted the Prud’homie and identifies the 
mechanisms through which these challenges might threaten the functioning of CPIs.    
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INTRODUCTION 1 
 2 
In November 1622, King Louis XIII visited the city of Marseille while touring his Kingdom of 3 
France. A fervent hunter and weapon master, Louis XIII allocated time in his busy schedule to 4 
fish Atlantic bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus, Scombridae) with local fishermen. The fishing 5 
party occurred on 8 November 1622 in the natural harbour of Morgiou in the South of 6 
Marseille. However, the harbour of Morgiou had not submitted to the King’s jurisdiction; since 7 
1452, it had been the property of the local fishermen, who also elected their representatives, 8 
raised taxes and exercised their own jurisdiction over the fishing disputes that invariably arose 9 
along the coasts of Marseille. Morgiou was, in other words, a small island of private 10 
governance within the Kingdom of France. 11 
For the fishermen of Marseille, the visit from the King was critical. The fishermen were hoping 12 
that Louis XIII would confirm the rights and privileges that they had slowly accreted since the 13 
Middle Ages. According to legend, the fishermen dug stairs in the stone of the cliffs 14 
surrounding Morgiou so that Louis XIII could safely descend to the beach. Curious visitors can 15 
still see, 400 years later, remnants of the “stairs of Louis XIII” in Morgiou.  16 
The fishing occurred in a special tuna trap called “madrague,” a source of immense pride for 17 
the local fishermen: it was their latest fishing technique from Spain that could catch up to 800 18 
bluefin tuna and had just been installed in Morgiou. Archival documents report that Louis XIII 19 
killed “more than 25 tuna” with a golden trident on that excursion, which lasted until the night 20 
and that he “had never seen anything that pleased him so much during his trip” (Lapierre, 21 
1938:38). 22 
It was not long before the King translated his satisfaction into concrete action: on 30 23 
November 1622, approximately three weeks after the fishing party, the King confirmed all the 24 
rights and privileges that the fishermen of Marseille enjoyed over a large territory that spread 25 
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across more than 20 miles of coastlines (AM HH370). These rights included the possibility to 26 
elect their own representatives to a special organization called the Prud’homie de Pêche (or 27 
the Prud’homie), which exercised a broad range of competencies over the legislation of the 28 
fishery, its police and the settlement of disputes.  29 
Beyond this success story unfolded another process that neither the fishermen nor the King 30 
could fully appreciate in 1622. It was the outcome of decades, perhaps centuries, of human 31 
development, and it ignored the artificial frontiers that human beings had patiently built 32 
between their communities. This process, which is now universally known as globalisation, 33 
was in its early stages at the beginning of the 17th century. At that time, the entire 34 
Mediterranean region experienced a “concentration and expansion of industry, a more 35 
rational division of labour, and increased production” (Braudel, 1972:432). In addition, an 36 
“itinerant labour force” swept across the Mediterranean during this period (Braudel, 37 
1972:43). Marseille played a key role in this burgeoning globalisation as a major port from 38 
which “barques and galleons […] were sailing over the entire Mediterranean” (Braudel, 39 
1972:220). The contemporary observer might find this process to be too restricted to be part 40 
of globalisation, as it primarily concerns the Western Mediterranean basin and its 41 
neighbouring countries. However, the reader should keep in mind that the “scale” of 42 
globalisation has evolved over time (Sassen, 2006:10-11) and that what might seem “local” or 43 
“regional” from our modern perspective was already part of the globalisation process several 44 
centuries ago. In fact, historians have termed these early, regional, stages of globalisation 45 
“proto-globalisation” (Hopkins, 2002). This “proto-globalisation,” which unfolded in the 17th 46 
and 18th centuries, is a key stage of the globalisation process characterized by the progressive 47 
growth of trade across nations, the migration of techniques and workers, and technological 48 
changes.  49 
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In this paper, I will explore how “proto-globalisation” impacted the Prud’homie and use this 50 
case study to build upon an important stream of literature concerning the governance of the 51 
commons. This work has emerged from scholars operating at the intersection of several social 52 
science disciplines. Among them, Elinor Ostrom designed a rich analytical apparatus blending 53 
political and economic theory that concluded that “common-pool institutions” (“CPIs”) are 54 
sometimes better equipped to solve the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968) than other 55 
entities such as the state and corporations (Ostrom, 1990). Ostrom’s ground-breaking theory 56 
of CPIs has broadly influenced academic scholars in various disciplines (Rose, 2011) as well as 57 
policy makers and social activists (Saunders, 2014), and it earned her the Nobel Prize in 58 
Economics in 2009. Specifically, Ostrom identified a list of “design principles” that characterise 59 
the successful operation of CPIs. In short, her theory rests on a rational choice analysis of how 60 
individuals voluntarily choose to cooperate and preserve the long-term benefits of resource 61 
exploitation when social games are repeated indefinitely, discount rates are low, and 62 
information concerning the past performance of social actors is freely available (Ostrom, 63 
1990). Ostrom emphasized how “successful” CPIs could be (Ostrom, 1990:59-60) by “enabling 64 
individuals to sustain long-term, productive use of natural resource systems” (Ostrom, 65 
1990:1).  66 
Ostrom focused on communities that are limited in size or that operate within a relatively 67 
small territory, such as fishermen in Alanya (Turkey), farmers in Valencia (Spain), or villagers 68 
in Törbel (Switzerland) (Ostrom, 1990), and she emphasised the challenges posed by 69 
globalisation for CPIs (Ostrom et al., 1999). For instance, she pointed out how “having larger 70 
number of participants in a CPR increases the difficulty of organizing, agreeing on rules, and 71 
enforcing rules” (Ostrom et al., 1999:281).     72 
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This paper builds upon Ostrom’s scholarship to analyse the ways in which globalisation 73 
processes affect the functioning of CPIs. Because of its rich archival records that date back to 74 
the early 13th century, the Prud’homie offers a relevant case study to assess the socio-75 
economic strains faced by a CPI confronted with the early stages of globalisation. The evidence 76 
presented here sheds light on specific challenges faced by the Prud’homie during “proto-77 
globalisation”: one is the import of a new fishing technique (the madrague) in the early 17th 78 
century, and the other is the arrival of migrant fishermen from Catalonia throughout the 18th 79 
century. Both events illustrate the difficulties that CPIs can face when addressing socio-80 
economic changes arising out of “proto-globalisation.” 81 
1. WHAT IS THE PRUD’HOMIE? 82 
The Prud’homie is a unique institution: it has been the legislator, judge and police force of the 83 
fishery of Marseille since the Middle Ages. Although it was imitated in 32 other fisheries along 84 
the French Mediterranean coast, the Prud’homie of Marseille is the oldest one that offers the 85 
most complete and best-preserved archives. In this section, I will describe the regulatory 86 
functions of the Prud’homie (A) before assessing its features against Ostrom’s design 87 
principles for CPIs (B).    88 
A. The main features of the Prud’homie 89 
The Prud’homie has developed three main regulatory functions since the Middle Ages: the 90 
creation of rules, their collection, and their application. 91 
 Creating rules 92 
Each year after Christmas, the fishermen of Marseille elected four of their peers for a yearly 93 
mandate as members of the Prud’homie (also known as the Prud’hommes), and the 94 
Prud’hommes would quickly engage in the creation of norms in two main ways. They 95 
submitted resolutions including specific rules to be voted on by the other fishermen, and 96 
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adjudicated disputes in accordance with these rules on a weekly basis (each Sunday after 97 
mass). I will return to the second task later and focus on the first one here. This first task 98 
typically arose when the community faced internal conflicts such as when groups of fishermen 99 
used competing techniques or operated in overlapping geographical zones. Over the years, 100 
the Prud’homie generated rules leading to a very rich regulatory corpus addressing the wide 101 
variety of techniques used in the Marseille fishery. The Prud’homie also designed rules aimed 102 
at organizing the social life of the community. For instance, the Prud’homie prohibited fishing 103 
on Sundays and religious holidays. This prohibition had an obvious religious inspiration in a 104 
highly spiritual society, but it also guaranteed the availability of the fishermen on Sundays 105 
when the Prud’homie held its meetings.   106 
Collecting rules  107 
The Prud’homie not only generated rules, it also collected them. The Prud’homie carefully 108 
preserved the numerous documents that contained the rules of the fisher community. For 109 
instance, it compiled the decisions of the fishermen’s community from 1489 until 1759 in a 110 
manuscript called the “Red Book” (AD 250E4). The collection of these documents was a crucial 111 
stake in the life of the community. In fact, as a product of its long-term history, these 112 
documents evidenced and guaranteed the autonomy of the Prud’homie and served as a 113 
reference point for members who were called to solve disputes that sometimes required 114 
precise technical knowledge. To preserve secrecy (and its autonomy vis-à-vis the state), the 115 
Prud’homie was reluctant to codify its rules but did so in 1725 when it entrusted a doctor 116 
named Jean-André Peysonnel with this task (AD 250E2). Peyssonel’s manuscript can still be 117 
found in the archives of the Prud’homie, and it provides a unique window into its past 118 
regulations. It also provides useful information concerning the species targeted by the fishers 119 
and their fishing techniques. Their main activity was in-shore fishing of small species such as 120 
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sardine (Sardina pilchardus, Clupeidae) or anchovy (Engraulis encrasicolus, Engraulidae), but 121 
the fishers also targeted larger species such as gilt-head bream (Sparus aurata, Sparidae), red 122 
mullet (Mullus surmuletus, Mullidae), turbot (Scophtalmus maximus, Scophthalmidae), bass 123 
(Dicentrarchus labrax, Moronidae), and of course, Atlantic Bluefin tuna. The fishers of 124 
Marseille mobilised various techniques to capture these species but seemed to favour purse 125 
seine nets for smaller species that they used with row-boats at shallow (bregin) or deeper 126 
depths (eyssaugue). I describe bregin, one of the most popular techniques at the time, in 127 
further detail in Part B. For the larger species, the fishers of Marseille used small dragnets 128 
called gangui and larger ones called tartanes that were pulled by sailboats. In Section 3, I 129 
further present the techniques for tuna fishing, the use of lines called palangres in the 18th 130 
century, and the type of boats used in Marseille.  131 
Applying rules 132 
In addition to generating and collecting rules, the Prud’homie was also directly involved in 133 
their application by adjudicating disputes and enforcing its judgments. The Prud’homie 134 
performed the first task every Sunday after mass, and its jurisdiction extended to any fishing 135 
dispute that occurred over its territory. The procedure was as follows: The plaintiff would 136 
place two coins in a special box to summon the defendant to appear before the Prud’homie 137 
the following Sunday. Both parties would then present their respective arguments before the 138 
Prud’hommes, who would render their decisions immediately after the hearing. The process 139 
was entirely self-contained as decisions could not be appealed by the losing party before 140 
French state courts. The procedure was oral; the judgment was swift; and its enforcement 141 
was immediate: Most parties complied voluntarily with the judgments of the Prud’homie to 142 
avoid ostracism and the loss of social status (AD 250E1, 8 January 1512). However, losing 143 
parties did not always comply, and in such cases, a non-complying member could be excluded 144 
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from the community, stripped of his voting rights and/or exposed to public criticism. The 145 
Prud’homie also provided the possibility to fine non-complying fishermen starting in the 15th 146 
century (AD 250E6, 13 October 1431; AD 250E3, 7 April 1489) but did not implement that 147 
option until later in its history.            148 
B. The Prud’homie: a CPI à la Ostrom 149 
In light of the above, the Prud’homie appears to fulfil all the design principles for CPIs 150 
identified by Ostrom: its jurisdiction was limited to fishermen in a specific territory (design 151 
principle 1: clearly defined boundaries); the rules of the Prud’homie were tailored to the types 152 
of fishing techniques and species found in this territory (design principle 2: congruence 153 
between rules and local conditions); all members of the community were eligible to elect the 154 
members of the Prud’homie and to participate in the modification of the rules through 155 
discussions and votes (design principle 3: collective-choice arrangements); the Prud’homie 156 
monitored the behaviour of fishermen and their compliance with the collective rules (design 157 
principle 4: monitoring); it used a wide range of graduated sanctions, including fines, public 158 
criticism, deprivation of voting rights and group exclusion (design principle 5: graduated 159 
sanctions); the Prud’homie provided a full-fledged tribunal that met every Sunday after mass 160 
to solve conflicts arising among fishermen (design principle 6: conflict-resolution 161 
mechanisms); the French state recognized the autonomy of the court by forbidding state 162 
courts from hearing appeals of the judgments of the Prud’homie (design principle 7: minimal 163 
recognition of rights to organize); and some of the fishing techniques were categorised 164 
according to specific rules nested within the broader governance system (design principle 8: 165 
nested enterprises). Individuals in successful CPIs also display low discount rates; they value 166 
long-term gains more than short-term benefits (Ostrom, 1990:88). Although Ostrom did not 167 
add low discount rates to her list of “design principles,” she noted how design principle 1 168 
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(“clearly defined boundaries”) increases the long-term stability of the CPI, a key in maintaining 169 
discount rates at low levels (Ostrom, 1990:91). 170 
In light of the above, the Prud’homie appears to be a CPI as defined by Ostrom. In fact, the 171 
rich archival record of the Prud’homie is replete with references to the long-term 172 
management of the fishery, thus confirming Ostrom’s finding that this type of institution 173 
actively engages in the preservation of natural resources. In addition, the fishermen of 174 
Marseille created collaborative mechanisms akin to those examined by Ostrom to exploit the 175 
fishing stocks. Consider, for instance, a traditional fishing technique used on the coasts of 176 
Provence since the Middle Ages called bregin. This technique involves 15 to 20 fishermen who 177 
split into two groups: one group stays on shore and secures one end of a net while the other 178 
group boards a boat and unfolds the same net while circling back to the shore, where the net 179 
is pulled by the entire crew (Baudrillart, 1827:75; AD250E2, 1725:47). Bregin can only be used 180 
close to shores (Doynel, 1886:6-7; AD250E2, 1725:47) at shallow depths and on sandy beds 181 
(so that rocks do not tear the nets), and it targets small fish such as anchovies or sardines 182 
(Baudrillart, 1827:76). A collective action problem arose from the fact that fishermen could 183 
only operate in a limited number of areas and would therefore compete over their occupation, 184 
leading to a race to the best areas. To solve this collective action problem, the Prud’homie 185 
designed rules to determine which fishing crew would have priority over these areas. The first 186 
group of fishermen who declared an interest in a specific area would have priority over the 187 
other groups, but once this group was done fishing, it would have to surrender its position to 188 
the second group who had previously declared an interest in the area (AD250E2, 1725:6). The 189 
ship’s boys gathered information concerning the “rank” of each group by circulating from 190 
house to house every evening prior to the fishing day (AD250E2, 1725:6). These collaborative 191 
mechanisms resemble those identified by Ostrom in Turkey, where fishermen took turns in 192 
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fishing zones by moving in a certain order, with the initial position of each fisherman 193 
determined through an annual lottery (Ostrom, 1990:18-21).  194 
2. HYPOTHESIS   195 
As briefly mentioned above, Ostrom found that long-enduring CPIs are characterised by a set 196 
of specific features which she called “design principles” (Ostrom, 1990:90). She also identified 197 
some of the difficulties that arise when one or several of these “design principles” are 198 
undermined, for instance in the context of globalisation (Ostrom et al., 1999). Building on 199 
Ostrom’s scholarship, this paper sheds light on these difficulties, and illustrates the ways in 200 
which CPIs might be affected when confronted with the early stages of globalisation.  201 
Although the ultimate causes of globalisation are unclear, its symptoms and effects are 202 
relatively well identified. In particular, the increasing degrees of interdependence and the 203 
interactions prompted by economic globalization have intensified cross-border exchanges, 204 
which have, in turn, accelerated the speed and intensity of globalisation processes (e.g., 205 
(Archibugi & Iammarino, 2002). These cross-border exchanges can be material or immaterial: 206 
goods, services, technologies and individuals swarm across borders in an age of globalisation.  207 
To test my hypothesis, I examine the ways in which the Prud’homie addressed two of these 208 
exchanges: the circulation of techniques, and labour migrations. In my view, both events can 209 
affect the cooperative basis of CPIs in ways that undermine their successful character (as 210 
measured by their ability to preserve the commons from overexploitation). 211 
A. Technological innovations and social breakdown 212 
The impact of new technologies on the depletion of fish populations have been well-213 
documented in the literature (Pitcher, 2001; Kennelly & Broadhurst, 2002). Ostrom was also 214 
well aware of the potential effects of technological changes on CPIs; she pointed out, for 215 
instance, how “rapid changes in technology” could lead to a “threatened resource without 216 
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adequate institutional means to respond to the new incentives facing the fishers” (Ostrom, 217 
1995:272-3). My first sub-hypothesis is that technological innovations can undermine the 218 
cooperative equilibrium established within CPIs by threatening their “clearly defined 219 
boundaries” (Ostrom’s first design principle). 220 
New technologies that emerge outside of the fishers’ community (and do not necessarily 221 
relate to fishery techniques) can impact insiders’ behaviour by creating new economic 222 
opportunities outside of the CPI. Indeed, the “marginal opportunity cost of capital in 223 
alternative investments” tends to grow in a “technologically expanding economy” (Clark, 224 
1971:632). Ostrom stated that “[a]ppropriators who are involved in activities that take them 225 
away from their [CPI] and into an economy in which other opportunities exist are most likely 226 
to adopt a high discount rate than are appropriators who presume that they and their children 227 
are dependent on the local CPR for major economic return” (Ostrom, 1990:206). In other 228 
words, fishers may find it beneficial to accelerate the extraction process in order to invest the 229 
resulting proceeds in other higher-yielding opportunities outside of the fishery (Clark et al., 230 
2010:215).     231 
The operation of new technologies within the CPI might also affect insiders’ behaviour in 232 
several ways. For instance, the use of new technologies can modify the perception by fishers 233 
of short-term risks. It has been emphasised that a “[n]ew technology is assumed to be riskier 234 
than that which has been well established, in that the usual market risks are compounded by 235 
uncertainties in installation, throughput, performance and the like” (Ashford et al., 1988:638). 236 
Higher risks typically result in higher discount rates (Lopez & Norris, 1997:132). In addition, 237 
capital-intensive technologies might encourage fishermen (who usually lack financial capital) 238 
to borrow funds on the outside market. Financiers might demand, in return, rates that are in 239 
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line with market rates, thus encouraging fishermen to increase the profitability of the fishery 240 
(notably by increasing catch levels).      241 
Both types of technological innovations could accordingly affect the “clearly defined 242 
boundaries” of the CPI by encouraging (i) insiders to seek opportunities outside of the fishery 243 
and (ii) outsiders to take part in the CPI’s activities (particularly when the technology is capital-244 
intensive). In other words, technological innovations, whether inside or outside of the CPI, 245 
would affect its “clearly defined boundaries” by exposing it to the wider economy. 246 
B. Labour migrations and “roving bandits” 247 
My second sub-hypothesis is that labour migrations generated by globalisation also 248 
undermine the cooperative equilibrium found in CPIs. More specifically, the arrival of foreign 249 
workers who seek to participate in a CPI potentially undermines the first design principle set 250 
out by Ostrom: it threatens the “clearly defined boundaries” of the CPI, understood as the 251 
ability to exclude others from its exploitation (Ostrom, 1990:91). Ostrom discussed how 252 
“[m]ajor migration (out of or into an area) is always a threat that may or may not be countered 253 
effectively” and that “[i]n-migration may bring new participants who do not trust others and 254 
do not rapidly learn social norms that have been established over a long period of time” 255 
(Ostrom, 2000:153). This threat undermines the cooperative basis of CPIs, which rests upon a 256 
perfect information hypothesis and allows the exclusion of defectors. CPIs cannot successfully 257 
integrate new individuals whose past records are unknown to the group because participants 258 
have to determine whether new entrants are defectors or cooperators before interacting with 259 
them. 260 
The literature on social cooperation anticipated this potential difficulty and emphasized how 261 
close-knit communities such as CPIs address the arrival of outsiders by discriminating against 262 
them. For instance, Axelrod demonstrated the optimal character of a cooperative strategy 263 
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called “tit for tat” and emphasized its “maximally discriminating” character (Axelrod, 1990:66-264 
67): tit-for-tat players do not cooperate with defectors but choose to exclude them from the 265 
outset. On this basis, Axelrod argued that social groups generating “nice” cooperative 266 
strategies (such as CPIs) can resist the invasion of individual defectors or clusters of defectors 267 
(because their strategy is “maximally discriminating” against them) (Axelrod, 1990:66-69). In 268 
the language of economists, private orders erect “sizable entry barriers” that prevent new 269 
entrants from participating in the trade (Richman, 2017:74). Prior studies of private orders 270 
provide support for this contention: for instance, Robert Ellickson showed that Shasta County 271 
ranchers ignore or exclude “outsiders” who refuse to comply with local norms (Ellickson, 272 
1991:56-64).  273 
This paper takes a more nuanced view of the capacity of CPIs to resist the invasion of outsiders 274 
who defect from community norms. This view finds support in recent research that 275 
highlighted the possibility of minority groups overturning community norms when they reach 276 
a critical mass (Centola et al., 2018). My sub-hypothesis is that CPIs cannot resist the invasion 277 
of defectors unless their organizational features evolve. The key reason for this institutional 278 
fragility is that “clearly defined boundaries” are never perfectly impervious to migrations as 279 
CPIs cannot systematically deny entry to outsiders. This is particularly the case when 280 
underlying globalisation forces drive migration processes. In fact, social history is replete with 281 
examples of “roving bandits” who successfully invade local groups and “overwhelm the ability 282 
of local institutions to respond” (Berkes et al., 2006:1557). Some institutions have been able 283 
to respond to these external pressures by evolving towards “rule-based governance” (Dixit, 284 
2006). They typically centralise information concerning new actors to preserve positive-sum 285 
games based on cooperation (Milgrom et al., 1990) and/or actively generate new social norms 286 
(Stone Sweet, 1999). Another successful strategy of “rule-based governance” is to rely on a 287 
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more constraining governance entity such as the state, which has the means of imposing 288 
solutions on defectors (e.g. Donda, 2017:150) or empowering local stakeholders with the 289 
coercive authority to do so (e.g. Stoffle et al., 1994:375). It is noteworthy in this regard that 290 
Ostrom included in her list of design principles the possibility for CPIs to obtain “minimal 291 
recognition of rights to organise” from the state (Ostrom, 1990:101) (design principle 7) and 292 
to be organised in “multiple layers of nested enterprises” (Ostrom, 1990:101-102) (design 293 
principle 8).  294 
In sum, CPIs may not operate successfully when facing societal changes incurred by 295 
globalisation processes as these changes are likely to affect the features guaranteeing their 296 
successful operation. For instance, technological innovations may increase the porosity of the 297 
CPI towards the wider economy. Labour migrations may also undermine the cooperative basis 298 
of CPIs by bringing in new members whose past record is unknown to existing members. As 299 
will be further explored below, the data provide strong support for both contentions. 300 
3. DATA, RESULTS, AND DISCUSSION 301 
 302 
The archival data presented in this paper highlight two social events that directly arose from 303 
proto-globalisation: one is the import of a new fishing technique called madrague in the early 304 
17th century, and the other is the arrival of migrant fishermen from Catalonia throughout the 305 
18th century. Both events are used to test the above hypothesis concerning the impact of 306 
globalisation processes on CPIs. As explained in this section, these events constrained the 307 
cooperative basis underlying the operations of the Prud’homie in ways that led to the 308 
overexploitation of fishing stocks. 309 
A. Technological innovation and the introduction of madragues 310 
The first example concerns the emergence of a new fishing technology called madrague. This 311 
technology was used to capture Atlantic bluefin tuna in various parts of the Mediterranean 312 
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Sea prior to the 17th century (Braudel, 1972:258), and it first appeared in Marseille in the early 313 
17th century (AD 250E2, 1725:145). A madrague is a gigantic fish trap made of fixed nets that 314 
can spread over a length of 275 m (AD 250E2, 1725:143) and is placed relatively close to the 315 
coast (300 to 450 m away from the shore), to which a single net is connected (Baudrillart, 316 
1827:275). Madragues are placed in the current, and they direct tuna towards a succession of 317 
net compartments. When the fish are trapped in the last compartment of the madrague 318 
(sometimes called the “chamber of death”), fishermen use an elaborate system of nets to 319 
bring them up to the surface and capture them. Figure 1 depicts one of the madragues used 320 
in Marseille in the 18th century. 321 
----------------------------- 322 
 323 
Figure 1 about here 324 
 325 
----------------------------- 326 
 327 
Madragues emerged in Tunisia before spreading to Spain and the south of France (Faget 328 
2017:127), and they circulated in the Mediterranean region as technologies spread during 329 
proto-globalisation (Braudel, 1973:763). The term madrague, which comes from a Spanish 330 
word (almadraba) that is itself derived from Arabic (and probably from the Greek μάνδρα, the 331 
“enclosed space” or “sheep barn” and the Latin aqua, “water”) bears traces of this 332 
cosmopolitanism (Faget, 2017:126; Gourret, 1894:245).  333 
A single madrague could capture up to 800 tuna during their migration periods (over the 334 
summer). In addition, the tuna could be kept alive in the madragues for some time, allowing 335 
fishermen to sell the stock progressively (and control market prices) (Gourret, 1894:266-7). 336 
For these reasons, the madragues became extremely popular throughout the course of the 337 
17th century. 338 
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In this context, the Prud’homie decided to set up a first madrague in a natural harbour called 339 
Morgiou (south of Marseille) in 1619 (AD 250E4, 28 July 1619:31) and a second one in another 340 
location called l’Estaque (north of Marseille) in 1623 (AD 250E4, 6 January 1623:64). However, 341 
the organization of the madragues quickly raised significant collective action problems. The 342 
main challenge raised by the madragues was financial: although the madragues could capture 343 
a high number of tuna, their construction and maintenance were extremely costly and 344 
required significant liquidity. For instance, the construction of madragues necessitated a 345 
significant number of nets and cork to set up the traps. The community also had to buy a 346 
house and a tract of land to store the materials necessary for the madragues (AD 250E4, 6 347 
January 1623:64). These important costs combined with the prospect of big catches made 348 
freeriding more appealing. The Prud’homie explored two governance models to resolve these 349 
difficulties, but both were relatively unsuccessful and gravely undermined the cooperative 350 
basis of the fisher community, ultimately leading to the waste of tuna stock. 351 
1. The equalitarian model 352 
The first governance model was based on a shareholding system. When the Prud’homie 353 
decided to construct a madrague in Morgiou, it determined that each fisherman who owned 354 
a boat was entitled to a single share in the madrague. This system gave the fishermen equal 355 
shares in the profits but also required them to contribute equally to the costs. This model 356 
sought to preserve the cooperative basis of the community by implementing an equality rule 357 
among the fishermen: all social actors would be equally entitled to the profits. However, all 358 
the fishermen could not contribute equally to the madragues because they did not have the 359 
same financial means. As a result, the question quickly arose as to whether an equality rule 360 
was sustainable for the future of the madragues. For instance, in 1620, the community 361 
discussed whether fishermen should hold one share in the madragues or if they could obtain 362 
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additional shares on the basis of their personal wealth and ability to contribute financially (as 363 
measured by the number of boats they owned) (AD 250E4, 5 January 1620:33). The result of 364 
this debate shows the strength of the institutional path dependence in CPIs: although the 365 
second shareholding structure was more optimal for addressing the important costs 366 
generated by the madragues, the community maintained the equalitarian rule (one share per 367 
fisherman, whether he owned one or several boats) to preserve its cooperative basis. For 368 
instance, in 1625, 172 fishermen (arguably the entire community) held shares in the 369 
madragues (AD 250E4, 5 January 1620:33). 370 
However, this policy was highly ineffective because the fishermen were unable to contribute 371 
equally to the madragues, and negative social outcomes arose very quickly: in 1625, the 372 
Prud’homie reported the “great losses” incurred by the madragues and a cumulative debt of 373 
6,750 livres (AD 250E4, 19 January 1625:81). The community was in dire need of cash, as 374 
demonstrated by an attempt to force a rich fisherman (Jean-Antoine Bauduf) to financially 375 
contribute to the madragues in 1629 (AD 250E4, 14 June 1629:106). In 1635, the community 376 
allowed the Prud’homie to resort to borrowing to finance the increasing costs (AD 250E4, 22 377 
April 1635:149), and in every subsequent year, the Prud’homie sought express authorization 378 
from the community to solicit financial loans.  379 
Until 1640 (AD 250E4, 5 February 1640:170), the Prud’homie maintained this model based on 380 
an equal shareholding structure, notwithstanding the grave financial consequences. In 1636, 381 
the debt had grown to 24,900 livres (AD 250E4, 9 March 1636:157) and caused an acute 382 
political crisis. In 1636, King Louis XIII placed the Prud’homie under his direct control and 383 
stepped into the election process to install new members of the Prud’homie responsible for 384 
clearing the debts of the community (AD 250E4, 9 March 1636:157). It then became crucial to 385 
explore another governance model. 386 
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2. The tenancy model 387 
After 1640, the Prud’homie abandoned the shareholding system and explored a second 388 
governance model based on tenancy. At that time, the debts of the Prud’homie had reached 389 
unprecedented levels, up to 39,000 livres. It was vital to create a new governance model that 390 
could externally displace some of these costs. The tenancy model presented such an 391 
advantage: it allowed the Prud’homie to rent the madragues to an individual, thus generating 392 
rental income and decreasing its operational costs. However, this model also relocated the 393 
significant financial income generated by the madragues outside of the community: the 394 
tenant generated its own income by selling the tuna captured in the madragues. The whole 395 
CPI would therefore lose its monopoly on the exploitation of the resource, and would be 396 
increasingly exposed to the wider economic system. The emergence of the madragues forced 397 
the community to open to outsiders who were more likely to be able to pay significant rental 398 
costs than were fishermen who often faced liquidity problems. Alternatively, only the richest 399 
fishermen could afford to rent the madragues, resulting in increased inequality within the 400 
community. My argument finds support in financial data concerning the leasing of the 401 
madragues between 1640 and 1688, which are presented in Table 1 below. 402 
Table 1 – The Tenancy Model (1641-1688) 
 
Period 1641-1654 1659-1663 1664-1670 1670-1676 1676-1682 1682-1688 
Lessee 
Jean 
Broulhard 
Jean 
Maïousse 
Jean Bauduf JB Jourdan Pierre Giboin 
Pierre 
Alleman 
Insider/Outsider Outsider Insider Insider Insider Outsider Outsider 
Price (per year) 2,964 livres 4,200 livres 7,200 livres 12,000 livres 8,625 livres 6,035 livres 
 403 
The Prud’homie first leased the madragues to an outsider named Jean Broulhard in 1640 (for 404 
a period of 14 years) (AD 250E30, 9 November 1640:11). The tenancy consisted of a flat fee of 405 
41,500 livres, which covered the debts of the community (39,000 livres), and a small additional 406 
payment of 2,500 livres (or a yearly fee of 2,964 livres). However, Broulhard quickly 407 
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transferred his tenancy rights to three other community outsiders (Messrs. De Gastines, 408 
Martin and Durand). For reasons that do not appear in the records, the Prud’homie did not 409 
maintain this first tenancy for very long, and it recovered the rights to exploit the madragues 410 
in 1645 (AD 250E31, 9 May 1645:1). It is likely that the Prud’homie did so in order to re-assert 411 
the community’s rights over the exploitation of the resource. However, the community was 412 
then placed in the same situation as before 1640, as it again had to subsidize the financial 413 
costs of the madragues: In 1657, a document from the Prud’homie reports “important charges 414 
and expenses” incurred by the madragues (AD 50E4, 7 January 1657:205). In 1659, the 415 
Prud’homie again turned to the tenancy model and entered into a second five-year tenancy 416 
agreement (from 1659 until 1663) with a prominent community member named Jean 417 
Maïousse for a price of 4,200 livres per year (AD 250E31, 7 January 1659:74). During a first 418 
time period (from 1659 until 1676), community insiders (fishermen) leased the madragues at 419 
prices that consistently increased (from 4,200 livres/year to 12,000 livres/year). However, 420 
during a second time period (from 1676 until 1688), the Prud’homie leased the madragues to 421 
community outsiders (a master tailor and a boilermaker) at prices that decreased (from 8,625 422 
livres/year to 6,035 livres/year). It is clear that the Prud’homie tried but did not succeed in 423 
maintaining a monopoly on the madragues.  424 
3. Growing debt, conflict and social disintegration 425 
One would expect to see a decrease in the community’s debt under the tenancy model due 426 
to the externalization of maintenance costs. However, this was not the case: the debts of the 427 
Prud’homie continued to grow at a rapid pace (see Figure 2), reaching 6,750 livres in 1625, 428 
75,000 livres in 1666, 140,000 livres in 1710 and 327,789 livres in 1726. In other terms, the 429 
Prud’homie’s debt was multiplied by a factor of 49 in one century (1625-1726), and by more 430 
than two in 16 years (1710-1726) (I disregarded inflation rates as inflation was negligible over 431 
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the relevant time period in France (Poitrineau, 1990)). The financial situation of the 432 
Prud’homie would only stabilise and improve around the mid-18th century, after the royal 433 
administration placed it under its direct tutelage. 434 
Figure 2 – The Debts of the Prud’homie de pêche (1625-1789) 435 
 436 
 437 
  438 
To explore the structure of this debt, I have collected data concerning 136 financial loans taken 439 
out by the Prud’homie between 1645 and 1788 (AD 250E94; AD 250E41; AD C2335). A review 440 
of these loans shows that creditors of the Prud’homie comprised not only prominent 441 
community members but also outsiders (such as various religious institutions and rich 442 
individuals). In other words, the madragues forced the Prud’homie to borrow funds, which 443 
increased the porosity of the community to the wider economy. In addition, the interest rates 444 
offered by the Prud’homie to its lenders ranged between 4 and 5%, which was comparatively 445 
lower than market rates (between 8 and 9%) and state loan rates (between 6.65 and 13.62%) 446 
(Weir, 1989). In this context, local fishers might have considered that a rapid exploitation of 447 
the stock (followed by reinvestment of the proceeds in the broader markets) was more 448 
advantageous to them than the long-term exploitation of the fishery. Subsequent events that 449 
are described below provide support for this argument. 450 
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The inexorable deterioration of debt levels can be explained by the fact that community 451 
insiders progressively ceased benefiting from the madragues after 1676. While the 452 
Prud’homie externalized its costs and received rental income, it no longer benefited from tuna 453 
fishing. Another reason bears additional relevance here. The debt appears to have increased 454 
rapidly because of a long string of cases before the royal courts that arose directly from the 455 
management of the madragues. These cases were extremely costly for the community. For 456 
instance, the Prud’homie took out a loan in 1635 to cover its litigation costs (AD 250E4, 22 457 
April 1635:149). These cases show the disruptive effects of the madragues on the Prud’homie, 458 
which was no longer able to resolve conflicts internally but had to turn to (and defend itself 459 
before) an external authority. I have identified nine cases involving the Prud’homie in 460 
connection with the madragues between 1624 and 1678. These cases fall into two categories: 461 
the first category of cases arose out of the efforts of outsiders to participate in and reap the 462 
benefits of the madragues (and the corresponding efforts of the Prud’homie to maintain its 463 
monopoly thereon), and the second category concerned disputes related to the tenancy 464 
agreements. 465 
Court cases falling under the first category resulted from the attractiveness of the madragues 466 
to rich outsiders and the corresponding efforts of the Prud’homie to maintain a monopoly on 467 
their exploitation. Some outsiders sought to benefit from the shareholding system established 468 
between 1623 and 1640, while others solicited the royal authority in order to set up their own 469 
madragues. In all the cases, the Prud’homie aggressively asserted its rights over the 470 
madragues by suing the outsiders, but it was unable to do so via its own court system and had 471 
to resort to the royal courts. For instance, the Prud’homie sued four individuals who 472 
pretended to be fishermen to obtain shares in the madragues (on the basis that each 473 
fisherman was entitled to an equal shareholding) in 1623 and 1624 (AD 250E191). The case 474 
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was brought before the administrative authority in Marseille (Lieutenant de l’Amirauté) and 475 
then before the royal courts in Aix (Parlement de Provence). Even more challenging for the 476 
Prud’homie were the efforts of members of the aristocracy to install additional madragues in 477 
Marseille (sometimes with the explicit approval of the King (AD 250E32, 29 June 1643:96)). 478 
The Prud’homie reacted internally by expelling any fishermen who would assist rich outsiders 479 
with the construction and maintenance of the new madragues (AD 250E4, 4 January 480 
1632:125), but this was insufficient to discourage the outsiders. As a consequence, the 481 
Prud’homie initiated lengthy and costly proceedings before the royal courts (Parlements) in 482 
Aix and Grenoble to prohibit the construction of the madragues. Overall, the proceedings 483 
were unsuccessful for the Prud’homie: for instance, the royal court of Aix enjoined the 484 
Prud’homie from preventing the construction of a new madrague north of Marseille (AD 485 
250E32, 30 April 1646:108). Even when the courts sided with the Prud’homie (as was the case 486 
in 1673 when they denied Dominique de la Crosse, a favourite of Queen Maria Theresa, the 487 
possibility of setting up a madrague at Sormiou (AD 250E227, 29 May 1673)), additional 488 
madragues would nonetheless appear on the Prud’homie’s territory; the social pressure was 489 
just too great for the Prud’homie to handle on its own.  490 
The second category of cases highlights the concrete difficulties raised by the tenancy model. 491 
The Prud’homie brought court cases against almost all of its tenants, demonstrating the 492 
weaknesses of the tenancy model: the price of tenancy appeared to be too high (or the 493 
duration of the tenancy too limited) for the tenants to obtain financial benefits. Three tenants 494 
requested a price reduction on the basis that they could not generate sufficient profits to 495 
recoup their costs, and one (Jean-Pierre Giboin) produced data showing his revenues and 496 
expenses for 1676, 1677 and 1678 during his trial (AD 250E235:9). I reconstituted the financial 497 
statement of the madragues between 1676 and 1678 in Table 2 below.  498 
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Table 2 – Financial Statement of the Madragues (1676-1678) 
 
 
Year Revenues 
Expenses 
TOTAL Operational 
costs 
Rent 
1676 13,698 10,130 8,625 -5,057 
1677 12,945 8,828 8,625 -4,508 
1678 4,776 9,496 8,625 -13,345 
TOTAL 31,419 28,454 25,875 -22,910 
 499 
Table 2 shows that the tenant operated the madragues at a substantial loss between 1676 500 
and 1678. Giboin accumulated a total loss of 22,910 livres during this time period. The income 501 
generated by the madragues (31,419 livres) was sufficient to cover the operating costs (and 502 
generate a profit) but insufficient when the rent was added. Another tenant (Jean Bauduf) 503 
sought to increase the profitability of the madragues by raising the price of tuna, but he faced 504 
another lawsuit initiated by the city of Marseille to maintain tuna prices at constant levels (AM 505 
HH372, 20 September 1664).  506 
The attractiveness of the madragues declined as lessees appeared increasingly unable to 507 
maintain sufficient profitability to operate them. The situation came to a stalemate because 508 
fishermen were unable to operate the madragues themselves (although they could arguably 509 
have generated profits if they had sufficient liquidities to make the relevant investments), but 510 
tenants could not generate sufficient profits because of the high rents. In 1688, the 511 
Prud’homie reported that no one had made a bid to lease the madragues for the last year and 512 
a half (AD 250E4, 18 January 1688:369). The solution came from a decrease in rent levels to 513 
increase the profitability of the madragues. For instance, the rent for the madragues 514 
amounted to 1,674 livres in 1717 (AD 250E256, 17 July 1719), and in 1735, only one individual 515 
presented a bid at a steep discount (150 livres/year) (AD 250E4, 6 February 1735:392). As a 516 
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consequence, the tenancy model persisted until the 19th century, but it generated decreased 517 
rental income for the Prud’homie. 518 
Another important lawsuit was brought by the Prud’homie against Jean Maïousse (one of its 519 
tenants between 1659 and 1663). In this lawsuit before the royal court of Aix, the Prud’homie 520 
accused Maïousse and former members of the Prud’homie of engaging in a conspiracy to 521 
divert the profits of the madragues. Maïousse signed his tenancy agreement in January 1659 522 
(AD 250E31, 7 January 1659:74) but entered into a counter letter with 31 individuals (who 523 
were arguably the real beneficiaries of the madragues) shortly afterward. These individuals 524 
included all the members of the Prud’homie in 1659 and 13 members of the Prud’homie who 525 
were elected between 1659 and 1662 (out of 16 members elected during this time period) 526 
(AD 250E31, 18 May 1660:94-109). One of these individuals was the 4-year-old son of a 527 
Prud’homme (AD 250E31, 18 May 1660:94-109). New members of the Prud’homie sued the 528 
tenant in 1663, arguing that he conspired with these individuals to divert the profits of the 529 
madragues (40,000 livres according to the complaint) and channel them back to those who 530 
granted him the tenancy (AD 250E213, 1663). In 1663, the royal court of Aix ordered that the 531 
tenancy be auctioned (AD 250E213, 14 March 1663). This lawsuit demonstrates the difficulty 532 
of maintaining cooperation when the prospects of immediate gains associated with a new 533 
technology modify the temporal horizon of CPI members. In economic terms, the discount 534 
rate of these individuals increased: they started valuing the immediate gains potentially 535 
generated by the madragues more than the long-term benefits derived from their sustained 536 
cooperation within the CPI. The overrepresentation of community leaders among these 537 
defectors demonstrates the great appeal of the madragues to the community and the 538 
difficulty of preserving cooperation in this context. 539 
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In sum, the experimentation with the madragues was unsuccessful overall: it divided the 540 
community, threatened its independence vis à vis the royal authority, and posed a serious 541 
challenge to its finances. The inability of the Prud’homie to manage the arrival of a new 542 
technology also led to overexploitation of the commons, thus gravely undermining its core 543 
function as a CPI. 544 
4. Resource waste: the collapse of the CPI 545 
As explained above, the Prud’homie tried but failed to maintain a monopoly over the 546 
operation of the madragues. As a result, the number of madragues quickly increased 547 
throughout the 16th and 17th century. I have counted no less than ten madragues that were 548 
constructed within the territory of the Prud’homie during this time period (see also ACCI 549 
YC/2209, 1790:21). Only two of these madragues were controlled by the Prud’homie 550 
(although leased out to outsiders); seven others belonged to wealthy aristocrats; and one 551 
madrague belonged to the city of Marseille. In addition, the madragues were installed for 552 
increasingly longer durations throughout the year over time (from May until October in the 553 
18th century to May until January in the 19th century) (MAR/C5/27-29). The proliferation of 554 
madragues seems to have had a negative impact on the tuna fishing stock. There are several 555 
reasons for this result. Atlantic bluefin tuna are a migrating species that are present 556 
throughout the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean region. Fishing practices in a specific 557 
location should therefore have limited impact on a stock of fish that circulate throughout a 558 
large geographic area. In fact, this was one of the arguments raised by the Prud’homie to 559 
justify the installation of the madragues in the early 17th century (AD 250E2, 1725:146).  560 
However, Atlantic bluefin tuna reproduce in warm waters (22°C to 28°C, which typically 561 
corresponds to Mediterranean near-shore areas (Ellis, 2008:48)) during the spring and 562 
summer seasons (Ifremer, 2016). This period coincides with the tuna fishing season in 563 
 27 
Marseille (Braudel, 1972:258), and madragues were typically established in areas close to the 564 
coast. The madragues would therefore capture tuna at a key stage and in key areas in their 565 
reproduction cycle, thus maximising the impact on the stock. In fact, there are several reports 566 
of a collapse in tuna stocks beginning in the 17th century (Faget, 2017:138). In 1769, a 567 
contemporary observer reported that the Prud’homie renounced the use of a madrague 568 
because tuna had deserted the coast of Marseille (BNF Gallica, 7 April 1769:9). A municipal 569 
report for the city of Marseille emphasized the “discontinuation and demise” of the 570 
madragues because of the collapse of the tuna stock in 1870 (AD 6S10/3, 22 June 1870). In 571 
the early 20th century, an official report stated that tuna had disappeared from the coasts of 572 
Marseille, and the madragues were subsequently discontinued (AD 6S52/1, 25 February 573 
1905).  574 
Although it is difficult to highlight causal relationships in the evolution of fishing stocks (which 575 
can be explained by a myriad of factors, including biological ones), it seems clear that the 576 
madragues negatively impacted the stock of tuna. The Prud’homie was unable to preserve its 577 
“clearly defined boundaries” and maintain a monopoly over the madragues, which resulted 578 
in their proliferation and the over-exploitation of the fishing stock. In addition, the 579 
intervention of outsiders and the division of the community appear to have modified the 580 
behaviour of insiders, who seemed to favour short term profits over long term benefits (as 581 
shown for instance by the attempts of the Prud’homie to divert the profits of the madragues). 582 
In economic terms, individual discount rates within the fishery appear to have increased. The 583 
introduction of the madragues in the Marseille fishery confirms Ostrom’s argument that CPIs 584 
might be ill-equipped to handle changes incurred by globalisation, so they require support 585 
from more traditional governance entities, such as the state, when facing these changes. In 586 
the case of the madragues, however, the support of the state was wavering and insufficient 587 
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to cope with these changes. The arrival of Catalonian fishermen throughout the 18th century 588 
provides, I believe, even stronger support for this argument. 589 
B. Labour migrations and the arrival of the Catalans 590 
Beginning in the 1720s, the Prud’homie faced yet another challenge when groups of 591 
Catalonian fishermen progressively settled in Marseille. The reasons why these fishermen left 592 
Spain for France are unclear (Faget, 2012:160-1), but their settlement in Marseille was part of 593 
successive streams of migration that unfolded beginning in the late 16th century in an 594 
overpopulated Mediterranean Europe (Braudel, 1972:415-8). In other words, the arrival of 595 
Catalonian fishermen in Marseille is another manifestation of the proto-globalisation that 596 
occurred in the 17th and 18th centuries. The Catalans deeply affected the life of the Prud’homie 597 
in a context that was already challenging for the local fishermen: their finances had been 598 
gravely affected by the madragues; the Prud’homie even introduced a tax on the sale of fish 599 
(the so-called “half share”) in 1725 to bring its finances back into equilibrium; and finally, the 600 
fishermen suffered heavily from the Great Plague that struck the neighbourhoods surrounding 601 
the port of Marseille in the years 1720-1722. The Spanish fishermen quickly demonstrated 602 
their reluctance to abide by the norms of the Prud’homie. Therefore, the arrival of foreign 603 
fishermen in Marseille throughout the 18th century provides a useful case study of the invasion 604 
of a CPI by a group of defectors. After describing the scope of these migration processes, I will 605 
show that the Prud’homie had great difficulty addressing this arrival and offered unclear policy 606 
responses that oscillated between the exclusion and assimilation of these newcomers. My 607 
empirical observations contradict the dominant literature on the solidity of cooperative 608 
strategies when faced with an influx of defectors (Axelrod, 1990:66-7). I will then retrace the 609 
negative social outcomes of these ambiguous policy responses. 610 
 611 
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1. The arrival of the Catalans 612 
As stated above, Catalonian fishermen arrived in Marseille in successive migration streams 613 
starting in the 1720s. These migrations did not raise opposition on the part of the French state 614 
(probably because they were limited in size) and were even allowed following an alliance 615 
treaty with Spain in 1761. 616 
The Catalonians settled in the southern part of the port of Marseille (while the local fishermen 617 
traditionally occupied the northern part). The competitive pressure exerted by these migrants 618 
over the CPI can be assessed by their relative number, but this assessment is rendered difficult 619 
by the lack of precise data concerning the population of Catalans who settled in Marseille. 620 
Faget reported the arrival of 39 Catalonian fishermen (presumably with their children and 621 
wives) between 1722 and 1792 on the basis of notary records (Faget, 2011:357). In contrast, 622 
the Prud’homie de Pêche reported the presence of 102 Catalonian boats with 812 crew 623 
members in 1787 (clearly an exaggeration based on political motivations) (AD 250E8, 624 
1787:89).  625 
However, the police department of Marseille provided a precise accounting of the population 626 
of Catalonian fishermen in 1826 (AM 18F6, 31 March 1826). It established a list of 117 627 
individuals, the majority of whom (83 individuals) were born in Marseille. All the individuals 628 
listed by the police were fishermen (AM 18F6, April 1826). This estimate is consistent with my 629 
own accounting of the community based on an exhaustive review of the fishing boats based 630 
in the port of Marseille between 1816 and 1818 (ASHD 13/P10/3, 1819). My data set shows 631 
22 Catalonian boats with 115 crew members (112 of whom were described as “Spanish”). This 632 
empirical evidence allows a comparison between the size of the Catalonian community and 633 
the overall community of local fishermen: the local fishermen operated 141 boats with 683 634 
crew members. Therefore, the Catalonian fishermen represented 14% or 16% of the entire 635 
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community (depending on whether this proportion is measured by number of crew members 636 
or boats) approximately 100 years after their first arrival. 637 
Figure 3 – The fishermen’s community in Marseille (1816-1818) 638 
 639 
 640 
 641 
Although they do not allow one to track the demographic evolution throughout the 18th 642 
century, these figures provide a snapshot of the community and of its size immediately after 643 
the relevant time period (18th century). They show that the Catalonian fishermen represented 644 
a non-trivial proportion of the entire population of fishermen in Marseille and that their arrival 645 
represented an invasion by a cluster of newcomers for the community (Axelrod, 1990:66-7). I 646 
will now assess the response of the Prud’homie to this invasion of new entrants. 647 
2. The response of the Prud’homie: exclusion or assimilation? 648 
The response of the Prud’homie to the progressive arrival of foreign fishermen throughout 649 
the 18th century is comparable to its management of the madragues: it shows a lack of long-650 
term vision and an inability to manage conflicts arising within and outside the community. 651 
When they progressively settled in the territory of the Prud’homie, the Catalans played a 652 
classic freeriding game: they started fishing in the territory without paying the costs 653 
associated with the maintenance of the commons. For instance, the Catalans refused to pay 654 
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the tax imposed by the Prud’homie on the sale of fish (the “half-share”) and did not comply 655 
with its rules. In addition, the Catalans brought a fishing technique from Spain that was already 656 
practised in Marseille, although less intensively. This technique, called palangre, consisted of 657 
floating a long line to which several smaller lines and hooks were attached, but its practice by 658 
the Catalans differed from that by the fishermen in Marseille. For instance, the Catalans used 659 
smaller hooks than those allowed by the Prud’homie, resulting in the capture of smaller 660 
species and younger individuals (thus impacting the fishing stocks more aggressively). They 661 
also used their palangres further from the shore due to their use of boats (Faget, 2011:45-8) 662 
that were narrower and faster than the boats used by the local fishermen and could therefore 663 
cover more distance in the same day. Figures 4 and 5 allow the reader to compare the types 664 
of boats used by local and foreign fishermen based on old drawings (AN MAR/C/4/178, 1785), 665 
and it can be seen that the boats used by local fishermen were wider than the ones used by 666 
foreign fishermen, which made them more stable but slower than the Catalonian boats. As a 667 
result, the local boats were suitable for coastal, net-based fishing (the preferred technique of 668 
the local fishermen, as highlighted in Section 1.B) while the Catalonian boats were particularly 669 
fit for palangre fishing further from the coasts.      670 
 ----------------------------------- 671 
 672 
Figures 4 & 5 about here 673 
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 676 
In other words, the Catalonian fishermen used more aggressive fishing techniques based on 677 
their equipment and boats which presented yet another challenge for the long-term 678 
preservation of the fishery resources. In this sense, the arrival of the Catalonian fishermen 679 
could be likened to a technological shock comparable to the emergence of the madragues in 680 
the 17th century.  681 
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In addition to using more aggressive fishing techniques, the Catalonian fishermen also refused 682 
to abide by the fundamental rules of the Prud’homie, such as the prohibition on fishing on 683 
Sundays and the obligation to submit to the jurisdiction of its court on that day. Therefore, 684 
the arrival of the Catalonian fishermen within the territory of the Prud’homie provides a 685 
concrete case study of a CPI faced with an invasion of defectors. The prior scholarship on the 686 
subject teaches us that CPIs typically exclude defectors to maintain control over their territory 687 
and preserve their long-term commitment to the preservation of resources. The case of the 688 
Prud’homie evidences a more complex response from a CPI that combined strategies of 689 
exclusion and assimilation without a clear vision for the way forward. 690 
The Prud’homie first reacted to the arrival of Catalonians by seeking to exclude them from the 691 
fishery. Shortly after the arrival of the first such migrants in the 1720s, the Prud’homie noted 692 
the negative effects of palangres on the fish stock and began prohibiting the use of small 693 
hooks. For instance, a document from 1727 reflects the concerns of the Prud’homie over the 694 
fishing practices of the Catalans: 695 
It has been only since 1722 that they [the Prud’hommes] have been scandalized to see 696 
foreigners from Catalonia come in their seas with palangres furnished with small 697 
hooks. The Prud’hommes, seeing the harm done to the seas by taking away small fish 698 
through the use of small hooks, renewed their prohibitions and their regulation 699 
according to which only hooks that are numbered 13 or 14 and that cannot harm [the 700 
fish stocks] can be used for palangre. (AD 250E2, 1725:45) 701 
 702 
The archival record also shows that the Prud’homie was unable to independently manage the 703 
activities of foreigners who did not comply with their regulations. They quickly turned to the 704 
French state to exclude the Catalonians from the fishery (without success). For instance, a 705 
letter from the Ministry of Naval Affairs (De Maurepas) to its delegate in Marseille dated 15 706 
November 1735 mentions a request from the Prud’homie to regulate the palangres (with the 707 
ultimate goal of excluding the Catalans from the fishery): 708 
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[…] by forcing the Catalans to fish with boats and nets similar to those used by the 709 
fishermen in Marseille and to have the same number of crew members, it is believed 710 
that they will no longer fish with palangres on their coasts in order to avoid the 711 
expenses incurred by new boats and new nets […] (AD 250E5, 15 November 712 
1735:320bis) 713 
 714 
Another example of the Prud’homie’s discriminating strategy concerned the attempts by the 715 
Catalans to dry their fishing nets in locations used by the local fishermen and the subsequent 716 
steps taken by the Prud’homie to exclude the Catalans from these locations (AD 250E276, 19 717 
September 1777).  718 
However, this exclusion strategy failed entirely as it became evident that the Catalonian 719 
fishermen would stay in Marseille. The Prud’homie became overwhelmed by the competition 720 
from a foreign group that rejected its rules and jurisdiction, so it attempted to assimilate the 721 
group instead of excluding it. In fact, these foreign fishermen progressively became 722 
indispensable to the supply of food for the city of Marseille. By supplying more (and arguably 723 
better) fish, the Catalans were able to attract the sympathy of local stakeholders such as the 724 
municipal administration of Marseille. On 7 November 1790, the city council issued a 725 
declaration defending the Catalonian fishermen on the basis that they could be credited with 726 
the “affluence of better fish” in the previous 50 years (AM 18F6, 7 November 1790). In this 727 
context, the Prud’homie combined its discriminating strategy with an assimilation strategy 728 
that consisted of attempting to encourage the Catalans to submit to its jurisdiction and rules. 729 
For instance, the Prud’homie tried to force the Catalans to pay the “half-share,” its special tax 730 
on the sale of fish (see, e.g. AD 250E5). To bring the Catalans under its jurisdiction, the 731 
Prud’homie actively sought the support of the French state by building a de facto alliance with 732 
the royal authority. The Council of the King, which was the main advisory body, rendered no 733 
less than 5 decisions between 1738 and 1786 to clarify the powers of the Prud’homie over the 734 
Catalans. The King even sent a special envoy to Marseille, Mr. de Chardon, who was 735 
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responsible for regulating the fishing techniques (particularly the palangre) and resolving the 736 
disputes between the French and Catalonian fishermen. The Prud’homie also initiated 737 
expensive trials against the Catalans before the royal courts. For instance, the Prud’homie 738 
sued the Catalonian fishermen who used the palangre before the royal court of Aix in 1774 739 
(AD 250E276). This trial is symptomatic of an institution that was no longer able to internally 740 
manage its disputes. At the same time, the Prud’homie actively lobbied public officials to 741 
advance its cause vis-à-vis the Catalans. These lobbying activities included gifts (usually tuna 742 
(AD 250E4, 8 September 1740)), the organization of festivals for public officials (AD 250E39, 743 
January 1743), and the preparation of written memorials in support of their position (AD 744 
250E36, 1786). For the latter activity, the Prud’homie enjoined the services of numerous 745 
lawyers including Portalis, one of the leaders of the bar and the main drafter of the future Civil 746 
Code (AD 250E8, 1787:146). All these steps were intended to assert the jurisdiction of the 747 
Prud’homie over the Catalans by seeking the support of the state. The Statute of 12 December 748 
1790 eventually gave satisfaction to the Prud’homie by submitting the Catalans to its 749 
jurisdiction and the payment of the “half-share” tax as well as granting them the same rights  750 
as local fishermen (for instance, the right to be elected as a member of the Prud’homie) (ACCI 751 
E/159, 12 December 1790). However, the support of the French state either came too late, or 752 
was effectively undermined by the revolution that was raging in France at the time. In fact, 753 
these measures that favoured the assimilation of the Catalans were ineffective as they 754 
persisted in forming a separate community in the subsequent decades and continued 755 
disobeying the rules of the Prud’homie (e.g., AM 18F6, 11 January 1817). 756 
The overlap of various strategies vis-à-vis the Catalans caused widespread confusion within 757 
and outside the community. The difficulties raised by the arrival of outsiders who refused to 758 
comply with communal norms and brought more effective fishing techniques had a direct 759 
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impact on the community’s management of common resources. It generated increased 760 
competition both within and outside the community and led to the deterioration of the fishery 761 
resources.  762 
3. Social outcomes: increased competition and deterioration of natural 763 
resources 764 
 765 
As shown above, the Prud’homie was overwhelmed by the arrival of outsiders, and it 766 
demonstrated its inability to govern the fishery under these circumstances. Some 767 
contemporaneous reports depict the utter desolation of the Prud’homie when faced with the 768 
repeated breaches of its rules by the foreign fishermen: 769 
All those breaches are frequent, as are the violations of rules. They [the Catalans] 770 
practice pit-lamping during the night, despite its prohibition under the laws of the 771 
fishery. They never pay the “half-share” [the tax imposed by the Prud’homie], although 772 
they recognize to be subjected thereto. The prohibition to fish on Sundays and holidays 773 
does not stop them. In particular, they avoid leaving [the port] with local fishermen on 774 
Sunday night in order to take their fishing spot […] and are always one step ahead of 775 
them: they are where they choose to be, occupy the fishing spots as they wish against 776 
the laws of cooperation and equality which they breach without hesitation. The 777 
negative consequences are significant. The escape of fish and their near destruction 778 
are the least of them. What is even more noteworthy are the injured equality, the 779 
insubordination, and the disorder and disastrous consequences of this insubordination 780 
(AD 250E36, 1786:6). 781 
  782 
The Prud’homie subsequently faced a collapse of the cooperative basis that until then had 783 
supported its operations and maintenance. This social collapse primarily concerned the 784 
relationship between the Prud’homie and the Catalans. As shown above, the Catalonian 785 
fishermen were perceived as a threat. An unintended consequence of this perception was the 786 
decline of the Prud’homie’s legitimacy in governing the fishery: For instance, the city council 787 
of Marseille stated in 1790 that the Prud’homie was no longer able to govern the fishery as 788 
the Catalans were “necessarily their rivals” (AM 18F6, 7 November 1790).  789 
In addition, the increased competition impacted the inner life of the community. The 790 
emergence of a rival group of foreign fishermen who successfully competed with the 791 
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Prud’homie relegated the local fishermen to a secondary role and caused tension within the 792 
community. This social disorder arose out of the practice of palangre, the fishing technique at 793 
which the Catalans excelled. This technique targeted relatively large fish and made use of 794 
smaller fish (typically sardines) as bait. Because of the efficiency and success of the Catalans, 795 
the local fishermen progressively found themselves relegated to the role of suppliers of 796 
sardines for the palangre. When the Prud’homie sought to prohibit the sale of sardines to the 797 
Catalans, it quickly faced opposition within its own ranks because of the profits generated 798 
through these sales (Faget, 2011:61). The superiority of the fishing techniques used by the 799 
Catalans also encouraged the local fishermen to imitate the foreigners rather than pursue 800 
their traditional activities. In a decision of 20 March 1786, the Council of the King implemented 801 
a series of measures aimed at encouraging the local fishermen to practice palangre: those 802 
who expressed a wish to fish with palangres would be given a boat, an exemption from the 803 
“half-share” tax for three years, and an exemption from military service (ACCI E/159, 20 March 804 
1786). The royal authority thus intervened directly to encourage the local fishermen to 805 
address the competitive pressure exerted by the Catalans, and the Prud’homie also supported 806 
this policy by allocating 8,000 livres for the purchase of lines for local fishermen who wished 807 
to practice palangre (AD 250E8, 1787:52). This policy, which was ultimately unsuccessful 808 
(Faget, 2011:78-9), demonstrates the weakness of a CPI faced with outside competition and 809 
the impact of this competition on the cooperative nature of social relations within the CPI. 810 
This increased competition, both within and outside the CPI, had a direct impact on the 811 
preservation of natural resources. As with the madragues, it is difficult to retrace the impact 812 
of a single set of historical events on the evolution of the fishing stock. It is clear, however, 813 
that the increased competition between social groups favored prisoner’s dilemma games in 814 
which each group prioritized short-term gains over long-term profits. The repetition of social 815 
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interactions that solve the prisoner’s dilemma (Milgrom et al., 1990) is premised on a level of 816 
cooperation that is deeply undermined by social conflicts. The arrival of foreigners, who 817 
arguably had a shorter temporal horizon than the locals (and therefore had additional 818 
incentives to extract resources more rapidly), compounded the problem. This situation 819 
translated to the use of more aggressive extraction techniques by the fishermen and an overall 820 
decline in the fishing stock. As a matter of fact, each group of fishermen accused the other of 821 
using aggressive fishing techniques, resulting in the decline of the fishery resource. As shown 822 
above, the Prud’homie accused the Catalans of using smaller hooks, operating at night and 823 
competing over the best fishing locations without abiding by the sequence rules implemented 824 
within the community. All these bad practices led, according to the Prud’homie, to the 825 
deterioration of the fishery resource (AD 250E36, 1786:11-12). Conversely, the Catalans 826 
accused the local fishermen of using dragnets that destroyed the seabed (including younger 827 
fish and fish eggs), thus leading to the deterioration of the fishery (ACCI YC/2209, 1790:29). 828 
Their argument found additional support in the reports of contemporary observers 829 
concerning the negative effects of dragnets in Marseille (BNF Gallica, 7 April 1769:23). The 830 
emergence of dragnets coincided with the arrival of the Catalans, and one could hypothesize 831 
that the use of aggressive techniques by the local fishermen was an attempt to keep up with 832 
the outsiders. 833 
CONCLUSION 834 
The present paper explores the ways in which globalisation processes can affect the 835 
functioning of CPIs. For that purpose, the data are focused on a CPI (the Prud’homie) at a time 836 
described by historians as “proto-globalisation,” when the early effects of globalisation were 837 
felt across the Mediterranean. On the basis of these data, the paper casts light on two events 838 
that arose out of proto-globalisation: the emergence of a new fishing technique called 839 
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madrague in the 17th century and the arrival of foreign migrants who disobeyed the rules of 840 
the Prud’homie in the 18th century. Those events directly affected the Prud’homie’s ability to 841 
preserve its “well defined boundaries,” a distinguishing feature of successful CPIs according 842 
to Ostrom. The paper therefore illustrates the social breakdown that arose from the early 843 
globalisation and the inability of a CPI to address the primary task for which it was formed: 844 
the long-term governance of the commons and the successful allocation of the fishery 845 
resource. 846 
  847 
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